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INTRODUCTION 
Rivers State of Nigeria was effectively without an incumbent Chief Judge from 20th August, 2013 (when the 
immediate past Chief Judge of the State, Hon. Justice Iche N. Ndu, retired from service) up until the 31st day of 
May, 2015. The current Acting Chief Judge of Rivers State, Hon. Daisy W. Okocha, Ag. C.J., was sworn into 
office on 1st day of June, 2015 by the incumbent Governor of Rivers State, Chief Nyesom E. Wike.  At the centre 
of the crisis was the insistence by the former Governor of Rivers State, Rt. Hon. Chibuike Amaechi that he had 
the prerogative to reject the recommendation of the National Judicial Council (hereinafter referred to simply as 
“the NJC”) that Hon. Justice Daisy W. Okocha of the High Court of Rivers State should be appointed to the 
office of Chief Judge of Rivers State. According to the former Governor of Rivers State, the favourable 
recommendation of Hon. Justice Daisy Okocha by the NJC for appointment to the office of Chief Judge of 
Rivers State was merely directory since the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) 
vests the actual power of appointment of the State Chief Judge in the Governor.  
Following the judgment delivered by Hon. Justice Lambo Akanbi, J., of the Federal High Court Port Harcourt in 
Governor of Rivers State & ors v. National Judicial Council & anor.,1  which set aside the recommendation of 
the NJC to the former Governor of Rivers State to appoint Hon. Justice Daisy Okocha to the office of Chief 
Judge of Rivers State, the former Governor of Rivers State in purported exercise of his power under s.271(1) of 
the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999(as amended),2 appointed and swore in Hon. Justice P. 
N. C. Agumagu, former President, Rivers State Customary Court of Appeal, to the office of Chief Judge of 
Rivers State on 18th March, 2014 without the recommendation of the NJC. In appointing and swearing in Hon. 
Justice P. N. C. Agumagu, as Chief Judge of Rivers State, the Governor purportedly acted on the advice of the 
Rivers State Judicial Service Commission to the NJC which preferred Hon. Justice P. N. C. Agumagu, to Hon. 
Justice Daisy Okocha for appointment to the office of Chief Judge of Rivers State.  
Quite expectedly, the NJC not only refused to recognize the appointment of Hon. Justice P.N.C. Agumagu as 
Chief Judge of Rivers State but also suspended him from performing the functions of his office as a judicial 
officer for accepting his purported appointment as Chief Judge of Rivers State without the prior recommendation 
of the NJC. As Ahuraka Isah, Media Aide to the former Chief Justice of Nigeria stated it, the suspension of Hon. 
Justice P. N. C. Agumagu was intended to preserve the authority of the National Judicial Council and “arrest or 
prevent judicial anarchy.”3 
On 3rd day of June, 2014 the NJC appointed Hon. Justice Daisy Okocha, J., as the “Administrative Judge” of the 
High Court of Rivers State with a mandate to assign cases to all the Judges of the High Court of Rivers State and 
to perform other related administrative functions necessary to prevent the complete collapse of the operation of 
the judiciary in the State.4  However, the Rivers State Government quickly reacted to the said appointment by 
issuing a circular directing all staff of the Rivers State Judiciary to refrain from taking any instructions from or 
dealing with Hon. Justice Daisy Okocha, J., in her capacity as the Administrative Judge of the High Court of 
Rivers State. The directive was coupled with a clear threat that any staff found guilty of its violation would be 
dismissed from the service of the Rivers State Judiciary. 5 
In the confusions that followed these conflicting actions by the NJC and the Government of Rivers State, 
members of the Judiciary Staff Union of Nigeria (JUSUN) Rivers State Branch declared an indefinite strike 
action on 9th June, 2014 thus completely grinding the administration of justice throughout Rivers State and 
depriving litigants of access to the court of justice.  
                                                          
1
 (Unreported), Suit No. FHC/PH/CS/421/2013 delivered on 18th day of March, 2013. 
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 Cap C23, LFN 2004 (hereinafter ‘the 1999 Constitution’). 
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 Lanre Adewole and Dapo Falade, “Agumagu: Politics, law and survival as Rivers CJ appointment crisis drags on” Tribune 
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4
 Tobi Soniyi, “Why Justice Okocha Was Appointed Acting Rivers CJ” ThisDay Live (04 June, 2014)> http://www.Thisday 
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5
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The new Chief Justice of Nigeria, Hon. Justice Mahmud Mohammed, in his first official reaction to the crisis in 
Rivers State Judiciary had blamed the former Governor of Rivers State, Chibuike Amaechi, for circumventing 
seniority in the appointment of a new Chief Judge for the State.1 The Amaechi administration in Rivers State on 
its part, had always blamed the NJC for undue interference in what was supposedly the internal affair of the 
State.2 The needless crisis and the complete disruption of the administration of justice in Rivers State which was 
unprecedented in history continued until the Hon. Justice Daisy Okocha was appointed and sworn in as the 
Acting Chief Judge of Rivers State on 1st day of June, 2015 by Governor Wike.  
Against the foregoing factual background, this paper seeks to examine the relevant provisions of the 1999 
Constitution (as amended) on the power of appointment of the Chief Judge of a State with a view to determining 
the constitutionality or otherwise of the actions taken so far by the NJC and the former Governor of Rivers State. 
It is argued that the politicization of the appointment of the Chief Judge of Rivers State by the former Governor 
of Rivers State, Rt. Hon. Chibuike Rotimi Amaechi was directly responsible for the crisis. Arguably, the former 
Governor was able to cripple the entire Rivers State Judiciary for almost two years because of a patent defect in 
the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 which does not specifically prescribe that the most 
senior Judge of the High Court of the State shall be appointed as the substantive Chief Judge of the State. This 
gap in the 1999 Constitution was simply exploited by the administration of Governor Amaechi for obvious 
political reasons to the irreversible detriment of the people of Rivers State who look up to the courts for justice. 
The paper argues that in order to depoliticize the appointment of the Chief Judge of the State of the federation, a 
constitutional amendment should be introduced to prescribe that the most senior Judge of the High Court of the 
State should be appointed to the office of Chief Judge of the State. The proposal will de-emphasize political 
considerations and ensure predictability in the process of appointment of a Chief Judge of the State of the 
Federation of Nigeria.  
This paper is divided into five sections. The introductory section provides a sketch of the factual background to 
the crisis in the Rivers State Judiciary and its adverse impacts on the administration of justice in the State.  The 
second section addresses the issue of qualification for appointment to the office of Chief Judge of a State of the 
Federation of Nigeria under the 1999 Constitution (as amended). In more specific terms, this section will attempt 
to answer the question whether Hon. Justice P.N.C. Agumagu, P., who at all material times was the President of 
the Rivers State Customary Court of Appeal, was qualified to be appointed by the former Governor of Rivers 
State to the office of Chief Judge of Rivers State. The procedure laid down in the 1999 Constitution (as 
amended) for the appointment of the Chief Judge of a State of the federation is examined in section three whilst 
section four proffers solutions to stem such crisis in future. The concluding remarks are contained in section five.  
WHO IS QUALIFIED TO BE APPOINTED TO THE OFFICE OF CHIEF JUDGE OF A STATE 
UNDER THE 1999 CONSTITUTION? 
The answer to the above crucial question can be found in sections 270 and 271(1), (3) and (4) of the 1999 
Constitution (as amended). Section 270(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) establishes the High Court for 
each State of the Federation. Section 270(2) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) provides that the High Court 
of a State shall consist of – 
(a)  a Chief Judge of the State; and 
(b)  such number of Judges of the High Court as may be prescribed by a law of the House of Assembly of 
the State. 
Section 271(1) of the same Constitution provides that the appointment of a person to the office of Chief Judge of 
a State shall be made by the Governor of the State on the recommendation of the National Judicial Council 
subject to the confirmation of the appointment by the House of Assembly of the State.  
It is clear from a literal interpretation of the above provisions that a person shall not be qualified to be appointed 
to the office of Chief Judge of a State unless he is first and foremost, a Judge of the High Court of the State.  And 
to be a Judge of the High Court of a State, a person shall be qualified to practice as a legal practitioner in Nigeria 
and shall have been so qualified for a period of not less than ten years.3 Put differently, the Chief Judge of a State 
can only be appointed from among the Judges of the High Court of the State. This position is supported by the 
provision of s. 271(4) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) which provides that: 
If the office of Chief Judge of a State is vacant or if the person holding the office 
is for any reason unable to perform the functions of the office, then until a 
person has been appointed to and has assumed the functions of that office, or 
until the person holding the office has resumed those functions the Governor of 
                                                          
1
 Ade Adesomoju, “CJN decries closure of Rivers courts” Punch (Lagos, 08 December, 2014)<http://www. 
punchng.com/news/cjn-decries-continued-closure-of-rivers-courts/> accessed 08 December, 2014.  
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ngrguardiannews.com/news/national-news-176716-rivers-blames-njc-members-for-crisis-in-judiciary/>accessed 03 
December, 2014.  
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the state shall appoint the most senior Judge of the High court to perform those 
functions. 
It is submitted that since only the most senior Judge of the High Court of a State is qualified to be appointed to 
the office of Chief Judge of the State in an acting capacity, it follows logically that a person who is not the most 
senior Judge of the High Court of a State cannot be appointed to the office of Chief Judge of that State in a 
substantive capacity.  It will be ridiculous and absurd to assume that the constitution intends to allow a person 
who is not qualified to be appointed to the office of Chief Judge of a State in an acting capacity to hold that 
same office in a substantive capacity. If the most senior Judge of the High Court of a State is the only person 
qualified to be appointed by the Governor as Acting Chief Judge of the State, it is very arguable that the 
constitution cannot intend that the person to be appointed to the office of Chief Judge of the State in substantive 
capacity should be anything less. Put differently, it cannot be the intention of the Framers of the 1999 
Constitution to make appointment of the Acting Chief Judge of a State more important than the appointment of 
the substantive Chief Judge of the State.   
Clearly, to argue otherwise is not only to impute absurdity to the legislature but also to charge it with 
deliberately seeking to subvert the time-honoured tradition of orderly succession on the High Court Bench based 
on seniority and integrity. There is indeed a presumption that the legislature is a perfect law-making institution 
and therefore, cannot ordinarily, intend an absurdity. In other words, in interpreting the provisions of a statute or 
constitution, a court of law is bound to proceed on the presumption that the legislature is an ideal person that 
does not make mistakes or intend an absurdity.1 Accordingly, constitutional language is to be given a reasonable 
construction and absurd consequences are to be avoided.2  
Therefore, it is submitted that a person who is not the most senior Judge of the High Court of a State cannot be 
appointed to the office of Chief Judge of that State either in an acting or substantive capacity. This is the only 
meaning that is consistent with a purposive interpretation of s. 271(1) and (4) of the 1999 Constitution (as 
amended).   
The above conclusion leads us to the question whether the President of the Customary Court of Appeal of a 
State (or a Judge of that Court) can be considered as a Judge of the High Court of a State for the purpose of 
appointment to the office of Chief Judge of the State? The Customary Court of Appeal of a State is created by 
s.280(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) which provides that there shall be for any State that requires it a 
Customary Court of Appeal for that State. Sub-section (2) of s.280 provides that the Customary Court of Appeal 
of a State shall consist of- 
(a)   a President of the Customary Court of Appeal of the State; and 
(b)   such number of Judges of the Customary Court of Appeal as may be prescribed by the House of 
Assembly of the State. 
The appointment of a person to the office of President of a Customary Court of Appeal or to the office of a 
Judge of that court shall be made by the Governor of the State on the recommendation of the National Judicial 
Council except that in the case of the President, such appointment shall require the confirmation of the House of 
Assembly of the State.3  
In terms of qualification, s.281(3) of the 1999 Constitution provides that apart from such other qualification as 
may be prescribed by a law of the House of Assembly of the State, a person shall not be qualified to hold the 
office of President or of a Judge of a Customary Court of Appeal of a State unless – 
(a)  he is a legal practitioner in Nigeria and he has been so qualified for a period of not less than ten years 
and in the opinion of the National Judicial Council he has considerable knowledge of and experience in 
the practice of customary law; or 
(b)  in the opinion of the National Judicial Council he has considerable knowledge of and experience in the 
practice of customary law. 
It is indisputable from the above provisions that the qualification for appointment to the office of President or 
Judge of the Customary Court of Appeal is different from that of Judges of the High Court of a State as 
prescribed under s. 271(3) of the 1999 Constitution to the extent that Judges of the High Court of a State are not 
required to have any knowledge of and experience in the practice of customary law. It is also clear from the use 
of the word “or” which separates s.281 (3) (a) and (b) of the 1999 Constitution that a person who is not a legal 
practitioner in Nigeria but who in the opinion of the National Judicial Council has considerable knowledge of 
and experience in the practice of customary law may be appointed as a Judge of the Customary Court of 
Appeal.4 Furthermore, it is clear from a combined reading of s. 272(1) and s. 282(1) of the 1999 Constitution 
                                                          
1
 Alhaji v. Egbe [1986]1 NWLR (Pt.16) 361 @ 370 paras C-D. 
2
 See Ishola v. Ajiboye [1994]6 NWLR (Pt.352) 506 @ 539. 
3
 See. s. 281 (1) and (2) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended); see also the Rivers State Customary Court of Appeal Law, 
Cap. 41, Laws of Rivers State of Nigeria, 1999.  
4
 The “word” is always interpreted disjunctively, see Arubo v. Aiyeleru [1993]3 NWLR (Pt.280)126, 141, Military Gov. Lagos 
v. Adeyiga [2012]5 NWLR (Pt.1293) 291 @ 318. 
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that the jurisdiction of the High Court of a State and that of the Customary Court of Appeal are not co-ordinate 
or identical because whilst the State High Court is a court of unlimited jurisdiction, the Customary Court of 
Appeal is a court of limited jurisdiction vested with power to hear appeals in civil proceedings involving 
questions of customary law only.1   
The conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing is that the High Court of a State and the Customary Court of 
Appeal of a State are completely distinct courts with different jurisdiction and membership. In Ado v. Dije2, the 
main issue raised for determination by the Court of Appeal was whether Hon. Justice S.N. Wali, a Khadi (Judge) 
of the Sharia Court of Appeal, Kano was competent to sit as one of the Judges of the Kano State High Court 
while hearing appeals from the Area Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal in a 
unanimous judgment answered the above question in the negative and nullified the judgment delivered by the 
High Court of Kano State. The Court of Appeal held that the Kano State House of Assembly had no power to 
modify or alter the constitution or composition of members of any of the courts established under the 1979 
Constitution and that such power lied only with the National Assembly within the ambit of the provisions 
relating to constitutional amendment. Coker, J.C.A. (as he then was) who read the leading Judgment of the court 
stated at page 267 of the law reports as follows: 
The 1979 Constitution of Nigeria prescribes in sections 234 and 235 for the 
establishment of the High Court of a state and the mode of appointment of its Judges 
and of their qualification. Similarly sections 240 and 241 of the same Constitution 
provides for the establishment and jurisdiction of a Sharia Court of Appeal of a state 
and the qualification for appointment of its members. The two courts are separate 
and distinct, with different jurisdiction and membership. A judge of the one is 
different from that of the other and its membership cannot be interchanged.  It is 
only the constitution of the country which established both courts and prescribed the 
qualification of their members and jurisdiction, that could make a judge of one court 
sit in another but regretfully no such provision exist in the present Constitution.3  
Although the above decision of the Court of Appeal was based on the provisions of the repealed 1979 
Constitution, it is submitted that the decision applies with equal force to the 1999 Constitution (as amended) 
because sections 270, 271, 280 and 282 of the 1999 Constitution prescribing the constitution, membership and 
jurisdiction of the State High Court and Sharia Court of Appeal of a State respectively are in pari materia with 
sections 234, 235, 240 and 241 of the repealed Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979. Therefore, 
the ratio decidendi of the decision in Ado v. Dije4 constitutes binding precedent for the determination of a 
similar question under the 1999 Constitution.5  
Thus, even if the Rivers State Customary Court of Appeal Law provides that the President of the Customary 
Court of Appeal shall continue to be a Judge of the High Court of Rivers State from where he was appointed to 
the Customary Court of Appeal bench, such provision will clearly be unconstitutional because the House of 
Assembly has no power to re-define the constitution or membership of the High Court of Rivers State as already 
prescribed under the 1999 Constitution (as amended). Karibi-Whyte J.CA (as he then was) put the matter 
beyond any dispute when he stated in his concurring judgment in Ado’s case that since the “Constitution has 
provided for the constitution of the High Court in its original and appellate jurisdiction, it is not open to the state 
legislature to make any further provision in respect of the same subject matter.”6  
It is further submitted that a Judge of the High Court of a State cannot be “seconded” to the Customary Court of 
Appeal of that State because the two courts are distinct and separate. However, where a State High Court Judge 
accepts his appointment to the Customary Court of Appeal of the State, he will cease to be a Judge of the State 
High Court at least from the day he takes the judicial oath prescribed in the Seventh Schedule to the 1999 
Constitution (as amended).    
The distinctiveness and separateness of the High Court of a State and the Customary Court of Appeal of the 
State have also been pronounced upon in the judgment of the Benue High Court delivered by Tur, J., in Chieshe 
v. The Customary Court of Appeal, Benue State.7 The court considered the question whether the High Court of 
Benue State and the Customary Court of Appeal of Benue State were courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction under the 
                                                          
1
 S. 282(1) of the 1999 Constitution; s. 2 (1) of the Rivers State Customary Court of Appeal Law, Cap. 41, Laws of Rivers 
State of Nigeria 1999; Okhae v. Governor, Bendel State [1990] 4 N. W. L. R. (Pt. 144) 327, 376; See Chieshe v The 
Customary Court of Appeal Benue State [2000]7 NCLR (Pt.1) 171 @ 180; Golok v. Diyalpwan [1990] 3 N. W. L. R. (PT. 
139) 411 @ 418; C. C. A, Edo State v. Aguele [2006] 12 NWLR (PT. 995) 545, 564-5.  
2
 [1984]5 NCLR 260 @ 267. 
3
 Ado’s case (n14) 267; The Supreme Court delivered a similar decision in Olawoyin v. Police [1961] ANLR 213 @ 225-226 
4
 Ado’s case (n14). 
5
 See Nwobodo v. Onoh [1984]1 SCNLR 1 @ 25; Okon v. State (1988)2 SC (Pt.1) 140 @ 155-156. 
6
 Ado’s case (n14) 280. 
7
 (2000)7 NCLR (pt.1) 171 @ 186-7 
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Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979.  The court examined the ranking of the superior courts of 
records as listed under s.6 (5) of the 1979 Constitution and concluded that the High Court of a State was not of 
the same rank with the Customary Court of Appeal of a State.  At pages 186-187 of the Law Reports Tur, J. 
stated thus: 
Thus the Supreme Court is the apex court of the land. Among the superior courts in 
Nigeria the Customary Court of Appeal is listed last.  The framers of the 
Constitution knew why it was so listed…The highest genus among the superior 
courts of record in Nigeria is the Supreme Court and the lowest is the Customary 
Court of Appeal.  At the state level the highest is the High Court and the lowest is 
still the Customary Court of Appeal. 
Continuing, His Lordship concluded at p. 187 of the Law Reports thus:  
From the above analysis it can be seen that the High Court is not of equal rank, order 
or degree with the Customary Court of Appeal in a State. Not being empowered to 
deal with customary law questions on appeal the High Court does not possess co-
ordinate or concurrent jurisdiction with the Customary Court of Appeal.  Even the 
manner the two courts are listed in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria 1979 (and 1999) shows that the High Court comes before the Customary 
Court of Appeal. The Customary Court of Appeal cannot take precedence over the 
High Court either in its original or appellate jurisdiction. That was never 
contemplated by the framers of the constitution. That is why the issues that the High 
Court can adjudicate upon are quite separate and distinct.    
The above was the settled position of the law when the former Governor of Rivers State, Rt. Hon. Chibuike 
Rotimi Amaechi purportedly appointed Hon. Justice P. N. C. Agumagu as the Acting Chief Judge of Rivers 
State notwithstanding the fact that Hon. Justice P. N. C. Agumagu was at the material time the President of the 
Rivers State Customary Court of Appeal. The constitutionality of the said appointment was later challenged in 
Goodhead & ors v. The Hon. Attorney-General of Rivers State, a suit filed at the Federal High Court, Port 
Harcourt Judicial Division.1 The plaintiffs in this suit challenged the constitutionality of the appointment of Hon. 
Justice P.N.C. Agumagu, P., as the Acting Chief Judge of Rivers State by the Governor of Rivers State on the 
ground that since Hon. Justice P.N.C. Agumagu, P., was the President of the Rivers State Customary Court of 
Appeal at all times material to the said purported appointment, he was not qualified to be so appointed. The 
Court, coram Lambo Akanbi, J., posed the following question at page 10 of the judgment: 
Now the question is – who is my Noble Lord, the Hon. Justice P.N.C. Agumagu and 
where does he belong? Is he a Judge of the High Court of the State appointed 
pursuant to the provision of s.270)1) of the Constitution or a Judge of Customary 
Court of Appeal under section 280(1) of the Constitution?  
After referring to the unchallenged evidence before the court that the Hon. Justice P.N.C. Agumagu was a Judge 
and indeed the President of the Rivers State Customary Court of Appeal and that his appointment to that office 
had neither been challenged nor nullified, the court held that the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
1999 has clearly demarcated the boundaries of the High Court of Rivers State and the Customary Court of 
Appeal of Rivers State and that the duty and function of one cannot be assumed by the other. At page 12 of the 
judgment, the learned trial Judge proceeded to answer the sole question he posed earlier as follows: 
Thus the inevitable conclusion I have reached is that His Lordship, the Hon. Justice 
P.N.C. Agumagu is not qualified as a State High Court Judge hence he’s not suitable 
and/or qualified to be appointed as Acting Chief Judge of the High Court of Rivers 
State. 
We have argued earlier that the Framers of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) could not have intended that a 
person who is disqualified from being appointed to the office of Chief Judge of a State in acting capacity should 
at the same time be qualified to be appointed to that same office in a substantive capacity.  Based on this 
premise, it is submitted that this judgment effectively disqualified Hon. Justice P.N.C. Agumagu,   from being 
appointed to the office of Chief Judge of Rivers State on the ground that he was not a Judge of the High Court of 
Rivers State. The argument that Hon. Justice P.N.C. Agumagu was the most senior Judge in the Rivers State 
Judiciary or High Court of Rivers State is simply misconceived because as shown earlier, he was not a Judge of 
the High Court of Rivers State at the time of his purported appointment.  Rather, he was, at all time material to 
his purported appointment as Chief Judge of Rivers State, the President of the Rivers State Customary Court of 
Appeal which is a distinct and separate court from the High Court of Rivers State. It is therefore presumptive to 
rely on his purported seniority as the basis of his appointment to the office of Chief Judge of Rivers State.  
                                                          
1
  (Unreported) Suit No. FHC/PH/CS/358/2013 delivered on 19/02/2013 
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The position this paper has taken on the ineligibility of Hon. Justice P. N. C. Agumagu, P., to be appointed to 
the office of Chief Judge of Rivers State is contrary to the decision delivered by the Hon. Justice Lambo Akanbi 
J., of the Federal High Court, Port Harcourt Judicial Division in Governor of Rivers State & ors v. National 
Judicial Council & anor.,1 where His Lordship held that there is no requirement under s. 271(1) of the 1999 
Constitution (as amended) that only a serving Judge of the High Court of a State or the most senior Judge of the 
State High Court is eligible to be recommended by the National Judicial Council to the Governor of a State for 
appointment to the office of Chief Judge of a State. According to the learned trial Judge: 
The provision of paragraph 21 of the 3rd Schedule to the Constitution does not 
empower the NJC to make its choice of nominee for the office of the Chief Judge of 
a State based on seniority of Judges of the High Court of Rivers State.2 
On the specific question whether the Rivers State Judicial Service Commission was bound to nominate only 
Judges of the High Court of Rivers State to the National Judicial Council for recommendation to the Governor 
for appointment to the office of Chief Judge of Rivers State, the trial Judge held at page 59 of the judgment that 
the Constitution does not curtail or limit the power of the State Judicial Service Commission:  
To choose only candidates from Rivers State High Court when performing its 
constitutional function in advising the 1st defendant on a suitable candidate. I find 
and hold that such suitable person of whom the 2nd plaintiff is to advise the 1st 
defendant must be persons who are suitable in the sense of being acceptable, 
accordant, adapted, agreeable, congruous, appropriate, becoming, conformable, 
consonant, eligible, fitting and proper for the purpose of the appointment as the 
Chief Judge of Rivers State and the candidate can come from a place other than the 
Rivers State High Court.  This is my respectful view and I so hold.   
Based on the above interpretation, the learned trial Judge concluded that Justice P.N.C. Agumagu, President of 
the Rivers State Customary Court of Appeal was qualified to be recommended by the National Judicial Council 
to the Governor of Rivers State for appointment to the office of Chief Judge of Rivers State. The learned trial 
Judge stated his conclusion at page 67 of his judgment: 
Thus I agree with the submission of learned senior counsel for the plaintiffs that 
aside the foregoing requirement of qualification of a potential candidate as a legal 
practitioner with ten years post-call experience, there is no other requirement 
contained in the Constitution for a person vying to occupy the office of Chief Judge 
of a State. To this end, therefore, it is also not a requirement of the Constitution that 
the next most senior Judge of a High Court of a State must be the nominee 
recommended for appointment as the Chief Judge of a State neither, in my respectful 
view, is it the constitutional position that being the President of the Customary Court 
of Appeal of a State disqualifies such a person from recommendation for 
appointment into the office of Chief Judge of a State. Indeed, much as it is desirable, 
a nominee for appointment to the office of Chief Judge of a State need not be a 
Judge. All that the Constitution requires is that such nominee should be a legal 
practitioner in Nigeria and has so qualified for at least ten years.  
It is submitted with greatest respect to the learned trial Judge that the interpretation he placed on relevant 
provisions of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) runs contrary to the principles and rules of constitutional 
interpretation which have been enunciated by the Supreme Court in several of its decisions some of which were 
cited by the learned trial Judge. In Nafiu Rabiu v. State,3 Hon. Sir Udo Udoma, J.S.C., emphasized that our 
written constitution is a sacred and organic instrument designed to serve not only the present generation, but also 
several generations yet unborn. Therefore, its interpretation by the courts calls for the exercise of a special 
jurisdiction and the courts must bear constantly in mind that the constitution is a “mechanism under which laws 
are to be made” and should not be equated with an ordinary Act of the National Assembly “which declares what 
the law is to be.”4  
According to Sir Udo Udoma, J.S.C., the approach of the courts to the construction of the constitution should be 
“one of liberalism, probably a variation on the theme of the general maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat.”5 
Accordingly, it is not the duty of any “court so to construe any of the provisions of the Constitution as to defeat 
the obvious ends the Constitution was designed to serve where another construction equally in accord and 
consistent with the words and sense of such provisions will serve to enforce and protect such ends.6   
                                                          
1
 Governor of Rivers State (n1). 
2
 Governor of Rivers State (n1) 62. 
3
 (1981)2 NCLR 293 @ 326-327. 
4
 Rabiu’s Case (n23) 327 citing The Bank of New South Wales v. The Commonwealth (1947-1948) 76 CLR 1 @ 332.  
5
 This maxim means that “It is better for a thing to have effect than to be made void.” 
6
 Rabiu’s Case (n23) 326 
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The above broad principles of constitutional interpretation have been restated by the Supreme Court in several 
decisions. In Kalu v. Odili,1 it was held by the Supreme Court that given the status of the constitution as the 
supreme law of the land, an extra duty is imposed on the court in the exercise of its interpretative jurisdiction of 
ensuring that the words of the constitution are construed with liberalism and that a wider meaning of the words 
used in the constitution should be preferred to a narrower meaning in order to bring out their true intention. 
Thus, the 1999 Constitution is to be read together as a whole, carefully not disdainfully, so as to give every 
section its true meaning.2  
These broad principles of constitutional interpretation were restated by Obaseki J.S.C., in Attorney-General of 
Bendel State v. Attorney-General, Federation,3 as twelve (12) guidelines to be observed in the interpretation of 
the constitution including other statutes: 
(1)      Effect should be given to every word used in the Constitution. 
(2) A construction nullifying a specific clause in the Constitution will not be given unless absolutely 
required by the context. 
(3) A constitutional power cannot be used by way of condition to attain an                               
unconstitutional result.  
(4)   The language of the Constitution where clear and unambiguous must be given its plain evident 
meaning. 
(5)     The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is an organic scheme of government to be 
dealt with as an entirety; a particular provision cannot be severed from the rest of the 
Constitution. 
(6)  While the language of the Constitution does not change, the changing circumstances of a 
progressive society for which it was designed, can yield new and further import of its meaning.   
(7)     A constitutional provision should not be construed so as to defeat its evident meaning                          
(8)     Under a constitution conferring specific powers, a particular power must be granted before it can 
be exercised.  
(9)    Delegation by the National Assembly of its essential legislative functions is precluded by the 
Constitution.  
(10)  Words are the common signs that mankind make use of to declare their intention one to another 
and when the words of a man express his intention plainly and distinctly and perfectly, there is 
no need to have  recourse to any other means of interpretation.  
(11) The principles upon which the Constitution was established rather than the direct operation or 
literal meaning of the words used measure the purpose and scope of its provisions. 
(12) Words of the constitution are therefore not to be read with stultifying narrowness.  
In Ishola v Ajiboye,4Ogundare, J.S.C., after adopting the 12 guidelines outlined above added 4 additional 
guidelines thus: 
(1)  Constitutional language is to be given a reasonable construction and absurd consequences are to 
be avoided. 
(2)  Constitutional provisions dealing with the same subject are to be construed together. 
(3)  Seemingly conflicting parts are to be harmonized if possible, so that effect can be given to all 
parts of the Constitution. 
(4) The position of an article or clause in a Constitution influences its construction. 
These sixteen guidelines to be observed in the interpretation of our constitution were adopted by Mahmud 
Mohammed JSC (as he then was) in Elelu-Habeeb v A.G. Federation,5 in construing the provisions of the 1999 
Constitution relating to the power of the National Judicial Council to participate in the process of removal of a 
Chief Judge of a State. 
It is submitted that in accordance with the foregoing guidelines, s.271(1) of the 1999 Constitution dealing with 
the appointment of a person to the office of Chief Judge of a State in substantive capacity ought to be construed 
together with s.271(4) of the same Constitution dealing with appointment of a person as Acting Chief Judge of a 
State.  The two sub-sections cannot be construed in isolation one from the other because they deal with the same 
office of Chief Judge of a State and both also appear in the same s. 271 of the Constitution. Construing s.271(1) 
and s.271(4) together implies that if there is any seeming conflict between the two sub-sections, the sub-sections 
are to be harmonized so that effect can be given to all parts of the Constitution.  
                                                          
1
 [1992]5 NWLR (PT.240) 130 @ 175-176. 
2
 See also A-G. Federation v. A-G. Abia State [2001]11 NWLR (pt.725) 689 @ 736.   
3
 [1982]3 NCLR 1 @ 77-78 
4
 [1994]6 NWLR (Pt.352) 506 @ 559. 
5
 [2012] 13 N. W. L. R. (Pt. 1318) 423 
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Another reason for construing the two sub-sections together is to avoid a situation whereby the meaning to be 
placed on one subsection when construed independently or in isolation of the other results in absurdity in 
relation to the other subsection. This purposive and community reading of relevant provisions of the 1999 
Constitution in order to ascertain the intention of the framers of the constitution was adopted by the Supreme 
Court in Elelu-Habeeb v. A.G, Federation in that although the case dealt specifically with the question whether 
the Governor of Kwara State could remove the State Chief Judge without the recommendation of the NJC, the 
Supreme Court considered not only the constitutional provisions dealing with the removal of a State Chief Judge 
but also those governing the appointment of Chief Judges and Judges of the State High Courts in order to 
ascertain the special role which the 1999 Constitution has assigned to the NJC in the entire process of 
appointment and removal of Chief Judges and Judges of State High Courts.1  
The case of Okhae v. The Governor of Bendel State2 also demonstrates the application of the principle that all 
relevant constitutional provisions should be read together in order to ascertain the intention of the Framers of the 
Constitution. In this case, one of the issues for determination before the Court of Appeal was whether in view of 
s. 248 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979, the Customary Court of Appeal of Bendel 
State could be properly constituted by a single Judge sitting to exercise appellate and supervisory jurisdiction in 
criminal causes and matters pursuant to the provisions of the Customary Court of Appeal Edict of Bendel State 
(No.16) of 1984. To be sure, s. 248 of the 1979 Constitution provided that “For the purpose of exercising any 
jurisdiction conferred upon it by this Constitution or any law a Customary Court of Appeal of a State shall be 
duly constituted if it consists of such number of Judges as may be prescribed by Law for a sitting of the court.” 
It was held by the Court of Appeal that although s. 248 of the 1979 Constitution was silent on the quorum of the 
Customary Court of Appeal of a State, the quorum of the court cannot be different from those of other appellate 
courts established under the Constitution which are properly constituted when sitting with more than a single 
Judge. Ogundare, J. C. A., (as he then was) who read the leading judgment of the court declared at page 366 of 
the Law Reports as follows:  
As I have pointed out earlier in this judgment, a provision in a constitution cannot be 
read in isolation where such provision is qualified by some other considerations. . . 
It is clear from sections 214, 226 and 243 that the Constitution intends that the 
superior appellate courts of record established by it be multi-member courts. Is it 
intended by enacting section 248 that the situation be different in the case of the 
Customary Court of Appeal? I cannot read such an intention in the Constitution. 
In his own concurring judgment Ejiwunmi, J. C. A., (as he then was) dealt with this rule of construction of 
constitutional provisions at great length when he declared at page 382 of the Law Reports thus:  
In my view, if the provisions of section 248 are considered in the light of the above 
principles, the first result of the exercise is that it is not permissible to consider its 
provisions in the abstract. It has to be considered as part of the entire scheme of the 
Constitution for the creation of appellate court for the hearing and determination of 
appeals from lower courts. It is clear that all appellate courts thereby created by the 
Constitution are fully constituted when sitting with more than a single Judge. The 
Customary Court of Appeal of a State should therefore not be an exception to the 
general scheme in the constitution wherein other appellate courts are duly 
constituted when sitting with more than a single Judge. True enough with regard to 
the Sharia Court of Appeal specific provisions were made in section 243 that the 
court is duly constituted if it consists of at least 2 Kadis of that court. In my view, 
the absence of similar provisions in section 248 ought not to be interpreted to mean 
that a single Judge could duly constitute a Customary Court of Appeal of a State. . . 
To do so would in my view, mean the reading of the section with stultifying 
narrowness. The result would then be an alteration or departure from the purposes 
and object of the Constitution.  
The learned trial Judge, with due respect, ignored the above cherished approach to the interpretation of the 
constitution when he opted to construe s. 271(1) of the 1999 Constitution in isolation and without reference to 
s.271 (4) of the same Constitution in spite of the fact that both sub-sections deal with the same subject-matter –
office of Chief Judge of a State. This error on the part of the trial court is apparent from the observations of His 
Lordship contained at page 66 of the judgment that “We are in this case concerned with the appointment of a 
substantive Chief Judge of Rivers State and not the Acting Chief Judge.” And at page 67, the learned trial Judge 
further observed that, “it is noteworthy that under the Constitution different rules govern the appointment of a 
substantive Chief Judge and an Acting Chief Judge of a State. As the issue before me is not the appointment of 
                                                          
1
 Elelu-Habeeb (n31) 491. 
2
 Okhae’s case (n13) 382. 
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an Acting Chief Judge, I shall say no more in that regard but shall confine myself to the appointment of a 
substantive Chief Judge for Rivers State.”  
While it is conceded that the subject-matter of the suit was the substantive office of Chief Judge of Rivers State 
the point being made is that sub-sections (1) and (4) of s.271 of the 1999 Constitution ought to have been 
construed together by the learned trial Judge in order to ascertain the true intention of the Framers of the 
Constitution. As the Supreme Court held in Wilson v. A.-G., Bendel State,1 the provisions of a Statute including 
the constitution must be construed conjunctively and not disjunctively. This is the general rule of construction 
referred to as construction ex visceribus actus (meaning construction within the four corners of the Act). It is 
submitted that a combined reading of the s.271 (1) and (4) of the 1999 Constitution supports the position that the 
framers of the 1999 Constitution could not have intended to limit eligibility for appointment to the office of 
Acting Chief Judge of a State to the most senior Judge of the State High Court while throwing the door wide 
open to every person in respect of appointment to the office of Chief Judge of the State in substantive capacity.   
In other words, since the Acting Chief Judge of a State is required to be the most senior Judge of the State High 
Court, there is no reason to suppose that the substantive Chief Judge of the State should be anything less. To 
argue otherwise is to create absurdity and patent inconsistency. The practice at the federal level relating to the 
appointments of Chief Justice of Nigeria, President of the Court of Appeal and Chief Judge of the Federal High 
Court which is based on seniority on the bench supports our position that the appointment of Chief Judge of a 
State must reflect a similar practice because the constitutional provisions governing these appointments are 
identical. 2   
As already argued, courts are required in the exercise of their interpretative jurisdiction to give constitutional 
provisions reasonable construction so as to avoid absurd consequences.3 It is for this reason that Coker, J. S. C., 
warned in Shosimbo v. The State4 that great care should be exercised “in arriving at momentous decisions which 
turn on the interpretation of the Constitution.” Clearly the learned trial Judge, with due respect, was wrong when 
he held that the 1999 Constitution (as amended) does not require the NJC to recommend only  the most senior 
Judge of the State High Court to the Governor for appointment to the office of Chief Judge of the State and that 
Hon. Justice P.N.C. Agumagu, former President of the Rivers State Customary Court of Appeal, was qualified 
to be recommended by the NJC to the governor of Rivers State for appointment to the office of Chief Judge of 
Rivers State.  
It is very arguable that the learned trial Judge interpreted s. 271(1) of the 1999 Constitution with stultifying 
narrowness. As one learned author puts it:  
In determining either the general object of the legislature, or the meaning of its 
language in any particular passage, it is obvious that the intention which appears to 
be most in accord with convenience, reason, justice and legal principles should, in 
all cases of doubtful significance, be presumed to be the true one. “An intention to 
produce an unreasonable result is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other 
construction available.” Where to apply words literally would “defeat the obvious 
intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result” we must “do 
some violence to the words” and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a 
rational construction.5 
The fact that similar appointments have been made in the past from outside the High Court of a State as pointed 
out by the learned trial Judge at page 69 of the Judgment offered no justification for the decision reached by the 
trial court. Clearly, one case of unconstitutionality cannot be rationalized by reference to previous acts of 
unconstitutionally, particularly where such previous acts were never subjected to judicial scrutiny.  
Unarguably, the interpretation given by the learned trial Judge poses a grave danger to orderly succession to the 
office of Chief Judge of the State High Court in that it gives the State Judicial Service Commission and the 
Governor of the State the prerogative to recommend and/or appoint any Judge of the High Court of the State or 
indeed any Legal Practitioner who has attained 10 years post-call qualification to the office of Chief Judge of the 
State. The clear and present danger inherent in this position is that the appointment of the Chief Judge of a State 
will become highly politicized as the Governor of the State would prefer to appoint a stooge as the Chief Judge 
of the State who would readily take instructions from him in the discharge of his onerous judicial and 
administrative powers as the State Chief Judge.  In this way, the independence and integrity of the Chief Judge 
as the head of the state judiciary will be easily compromised.  
                                                          
1
 [1985] 1 N. W. L. R. (Pt. 4) 572, 601.  
2
 See sections 230, 231, 237, 238, 249, and 250 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended).  
3
 Elelu-Habeeb (n31) 490; Ishola v. Ajiboye (n30) 559. 
4
 (1974) 10 S. C. 91, 103 
5
 P. St. J. Langan, Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes (12th edition LexisNexis, New Delhi 2006) 199 citing Artemiou v. 
Procopiou [1966]1Q. B. 878 @ 888, per Danckwerts L. J., and Luke v. I. R. C. [1963] A. C. 557 @  577, per Lord Reid.   
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Furthermore, the absence of an orderly and predictable system of succession to the office of Chief Judge of the 
State will encourage executive mindedness among Judges who may hope to earn the confidence of the Governor 
for the purpose of securing appointment to the office of Chief Judge of the State. It is also arguable that the 
absence of an orderly and predictable system of succession to the office of Chief Judge of the State will 
encourage unhealthy rivalry and acrimonious competition amongst Judges for appointment to the office of Chief 
Judge. The combination of these factors will destroy the brotherly bond amongst Judges and stymie the growth 
of a cohesive, strong and vibrant judiciary. A weak, docile and compromised judiciary poses more danger to 
society and the liberty of its citizenry than the assault of a rampaging army. 
Finally, the interpretation runs contrary to the practice at the federal level where the appointment of the Chief 
Justice of Nigeria, President of the Court of Appeal and Chief Judge of the Federal High Court is predictably 
certain and devoid of political considerations and manipulations. Appointments to these offices are based strictly 
on seniority among serving Justices of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and Judges of the Federal High 
Court.1 There is obviously no reason to justify a departure in the state judiciary.  
PROCEDURE FOR APPOINTMENT OF THE CHIEF JUDGE OF A STATE 
The resolution of the above question leads us to the consideration of the procedure for appointment of the Chief 
Judge of a State under s.271 (1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). We have already referred to s.271 (1) of 
the 1999 Constitution which provides as follows: 
s.271(1): The appointment of a person to the office of Chief Judge of a State shall be 
made by the Governor of the State on the recommendation of the National Judicial 
Council subject to confirmation of the appointment by the House of Assembly of the 
State.2  
The above provision is to be read in conjunction with paragraph 21(c) of Part 1 of the Third Schedule to the 1999 
Constitution which provides that the National Judicial Council shall have power to: 
(a) xxxxxxxxx 
(b) xxxxxxxxxx 
(c) recommend to the Governors from among the list of persons submitted to it by 
the State Judicial Service Commissions persons for appointments to the offices 
of the Chief Judges of the States and Judges of the High Courts of the States, the 
Grand Kadis and Kadis of the Sharia Courts of Appeal of the States and 
Presidents and Judges of the Customary Courts of Appeal of the States. 
Also relevant to the appointment of Chief Judge of a State is paragraph 6(a)(i) of Part II of the Third Schedule to 
the 1999 Constitution which provides that the State Judicial Service Commission shall have power to “advise 
the National Judicial Council on suitable persons for nominations to the office of the Chief Judge of the State.” 
It is evident from the above plain and unambiguous provisions of the 1999 Constitution that the process of 
appointment of Chief Judge of a State involves the active participation of the three organs of government, 
namely the Judiciary (the State Judicial Service Commission and the National Judicial Council); the Executive 
(the Governor); and the Legislature (the State House of Assembly). Since the appointment of Chief Judge of a 
State involves a process which is consummated with the formal appointment under the hands of the State 
Governor, it is beyond any dispute that the 1999 Constitution does not vest the power of appointment of Chief 
Judge of a State solely in the Governor.  On the contrary, the power of appointment of Chief Judge of a State is 
shared among the three organs of government in order to ensure checks and balances and avoid arbitrariness and 
abuse of power.  
In Elelu-Habeeb v. A.-G., Federation3  it was held by the Supreme Court that by virtue of s.271 (1) and 
paragraph 21(c) and (d) of Part 1 of the Third Schedule to the 1999 Constitution, the National Judicial Council is 
vested with the duty and responsibility of recommending to the Governors of the States of the Federation 
suitable persons for appointments to the offices of Chief Judges of the States and other Judicial officers in the 
States. Mohammed, J.S.C., (as he then was) who delivered the leading judgment of the apex court underscored 
the tripartite scheme enshrined in the 1999 Constitution (as amended) for the appointment of Chief Judge of a  
State at page 493 of the Law Reports thus: 
It can be seen here again, although the Governor of a State has been vested with the 
power to appoint the Chief Judge of his own State, that power is not absolute as the 
Governor has to share the power with the National Judicial Council in 
recommending suitable persons and the State House of Assembly in confirming the 
                                                          
1
 The last Chief Justice of Nigeria to be appointed from outside the Supreme Court Bench was the Hon. Justice T. O. Elias, C. 
J. N., who was appointed from the bar and the last Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria to be appointed straight from the 
Nigerian Bar was Hon. Justice Augustine Nnamani, J. S. C.  
2
 Underlining supplied for emphasis.  
3
  Elelu-Habeeb (n31) 492-493. 
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appointment. It is in the spirit of the Constitution in ensuring checks and balances 
between the three arms of government that the role of the Governor in appointing 
and exercising disciplinary control over the Chief Judge of his State is subjected to 
the participation of the National Judicial Council and the House of Assembly of the 
State in the exercise to ensure transparency and observance of the Rule of Law. 
The assignment of the power of appointment of Chief Judges and other judicial officers of the States to the State 
Governors under the 1999 Constitution may appear questionable at first sight not least because it raises the fear 
that the executive arm of government could interfere with the independence of the judiciary through the exercise 
of such enormous power. However, Nwabueze has provided a compelling justification for the vesting of the 
power of appointment of judicial officers in the executive.  According to the erudite constitutional jurist: 
The office of a Judge is a strategic one in the machinery of government, and in a 
country that professes democracy it might be argued that judicial appointments 
should depend on the consent of the people just as those of the legislature and the 
executive do. That is indeed the position in some States of the United States, where 
judges are elected directly by the people. But the office of a judge requires special 
qualifications and ability, which cannot adequately be judged by the electorate.1   
Continuing, Nwabueze notes that: 
Given the unsuitability of the people as a body to appoint judges, it becomes 
important, if the requirements of democracy are to be adequately met, that the 
people’s elected representatives in government should be actively associated in the 
process of appointment. The executive in particular has been chosen by the people 
and entrusted by them and by the constitution with full responsibility for the 
government of the country. Its responsibility for government requires that, except 
for those elected directly by the people, it should have an effective say in the 
appointment of all important function arises of the state.2 
The vesting of the power of appointment of judicial officers in the executive, therefore, derives from the notion 
that since the government of the state has been entrusted to the executive by popular vote in accordance with the 
constitution, the executive as the representative of the people, should be involved in the appointment of persons 
to be entrusted with the onerous task of administering justice in the name of the state.  The same argument 
logically justifies the role assigned to the legislature under the constitution to confirm the appointments of 
judicial officers proposed by the executive before the same can take effect.  
The tripartite scheme laid down in the 1999 Constitution (as amended) for the appointment of Chief Judge of a 
State requires strict compliance with certain pre-requisites which can be distilled from a community reading of s. 
271, paragraph 21(c) of Part 1 of the Third Schedule and paragraph 6(a) (i) of Part II of the Third Schedule to 
the 1999 Constitution (as amended).  
First, the State Judicial Service Commission submits a list of persons considered suitable for nomination to the 
office of Chief Judge of the State to the National Judicial Council for consideration. The role of the State 
Judicial Service Commission is to “advise” the National Judicial Council on the suitability of the nominees 
proposed on the list for appointment to the office of Chief Judge of the State.3 Therefore, the nominees on the 
list may be arranged in their order of preference by the State Judicial Service Commission. In practice, two 
nominees are usually proposed by the State Judicial Service Commission to the National Judicial Council for 
consideration for recommendation to the Governor. Given that the role of the State Judicial Service Commission 
is purely advisory, it is very arguable that the National Judicial Council is not bound to accept the preferred 
nominee of the State Judicial Service Commission for recommendation to the Governor although the National 
Judicial Council cannot recommend a person not proposed in the list submitted by the State Judicial Service 
Commission.  
Secondly, the National Judicial Council considers the list of nominees submitted to it by the State Judicial 
Service Commission and recommends one person only from the said list to the Governor of the State for 
appointment to the office of Chief Judge of the State. Thus, unlike the State Judicial Service Commission that 
proposes at least two suitable nominees for consideration, the National Judicial Service on its part “does not 
send a list of preferred candidates for any single vacancy”4; it merely recommends one suitably qualified 
candidate to the Governor for appointment to the office of Chief Judge of the State. It is arguable that although 
                                                          
1
 See B.O. Nwabueze, The Presidential Constitution of Nigeria (C. Hurst & Company, London, 1982) 302. 
2
 Nwabueze (n41) 302; See also Roberts-Wray, “The Independence of the Judiciary in Commonwealth Countries” in J. N. D. 
Anderson (ed), Changing Law in Developing Countries (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London 1963) 67-68. 
3
 See paragraph 6(a) of Part II, Third Schedule to the 1999 Constitution (as amended).  
4
 B. M. Wifa, “The Independence of the Judiciary in the context of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers under The 1999 
Constitution” Being Paper Presented at the July Monthly Meeting of the Nigerian Bar Association, Port Harcourt  Branch 
(Port Harcourt, July 2014) 23.  
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the 1999 Constitution (as amended) does not require the National Judicial Council to consider the list submitted 
to it by the State Judicial Service Commission by reference to any particular criteria or material, the overriding 
consideration of the NJC is to recommend the most suitably qualified candidate to the State Governor for 
appointment to the office of Chief Judge of the State. In discharging its constitutional responsibility in this 
regard, it is expected that the National Judicial Council will give adequate consideration to relevant information 
on each nominee on the list including such matters as seniority on the bench, performance, integrity, 
comportment, and available security reports.1 
Thirdly, the Governor considers the recommendation of the National Judicial Council and if he accepts the 
recommendation, transmits the name of the candidate so recommended to the House of Assembly for 
confirmation before the appointment is made.  
It is clear that the wording of s.271 (1) of the 1999 Constitution prescribing that the Governor shall appoint the 
Chief Judge of a state “on the recommendation of the National Judicial Council” contrasts with the wording of 
s.235 (1) of the 1979 Constitution which provided that the Governor shall appoint the Chief Judge “on the 
advice of the State Judicial Service Commission.” The difference between the language of s.271(1) of the 1999 
Constitution and that of s.235(1) of the 1979 Constitution lies in the fact that under the 1999 Constitution and 
unlike the position under the 1979 Constitution, the Governor of a State is not bound to accept the 
recommendation of the National Judicial Council although he cannot himself, appoint a person not 
recommended by the National Judicial Council nor can he recommend to the National Judicial Council a person 
whom he wishes to be appointed to the office of Chief Judge of the State. Therefore, although the Governor is 
not bound by the recommendation of the National Judicial Council, he cannot appoint any person to the office of 
Chief Judge of the State without the prior recommendation of the National Council. In other words, the prior 
recommendation of the National Judicial Council constitutes a condition precedent to any valid appointment by 
the Governor.  
Thus, the 1999 Constitution does not contemplate a unilateral appointment by the Governor of any person to the 
office of Chief Judge of a State of the Federation without the favourable recommendation of the NJC. The 
position has been well stated by Nwabueze when he noted that appointment by the President or Governor on the 
recommendation of the National Judicial Council does not:  
Completely exclude a discretion in the president or governor.  He cannot of course 
appoint a person who has not been recommended by the commission.  The wording 
of the provision that ‘the appointment of a person to the office of judge… shall be 
made by the president (or Governor) on the recommendation of the Federal (or state) 
Judicial Service Commission makes it clear that a person must be favourably 
recommended before he can be appointed. But the president or governor is not 
bound to appoint a person on whom a favourable recommendation has been made. A 
binding recommendation is a contradiction in terms.2  
The learned constitutional jurist then stated the option open to a Governor who wishes to reject the 
recommendation of the commission to appoint a particular person thus: 
Where, however the president or governor turns down a person recommended by the 
commission, he cannot appoint someone else who has not been recommended at all. 
He must ask the commission to recommend another person.3 
It is submitted that based on the above interpretation of the phrase, “on the recommendation of the National 
Judicial Council,” in s. 271(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), the Governor of Rivers State lacked the 
power to appoint Hon. Justice P.N.C. Agumagu to the office of Chief Judge of Rivers State without the prior 
recommendation of the National Judicial Council. It is immaterial that Hon. Justice P.N.C. Agumagu, P., was 
the preferred candidate on the list submitted by the Rivers State Judicial Service Commission to the National 
Judicial Council because the recommendation on which the governor’s appointment is required to be predicated 
under s. 271(1) of the 1999 Constitution is that made by the National Judicial Council, rather than the State 
Judicial Service Commission. Thus, the list submitted by the State Judicial Service Commission to the National 
                                                          
1
 See the National Judicial Policy, S.I. No.23 of 2013 which came into operation on 1st day of July, 2013; Code of Conduct 
for Judicial Officers of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; See generally, Justice Niki Tobi, “Code of Conduct and Professional 
Ethics for Judicial Officers in Nigeria” in J. O. Irukwu and Justice I. A. Umezulike (eds), Judicial Excellence: Essays in 
Honour of Hon. Justice Anthony I. Iguh (J.S.C) (Snaap Press Limited, Enugu 2004) 37, 39-83.  
2
 Nwabueze (n 41) 303; See also the Hon. Justice A. O. Ejiwunmi, “Commentary” on the Paper delivered by the Hon. Justice 
Okay Achike titled “The Place of all Courts of Law in Nigeria Including Area Courts and Customary Courts under the 
Constitution” in All-Nigeria Judges’ Conference Papers 1993, Port Harcourt 15th -20th November, 1993 (Anatraco Limited, 
Lagos 1994) 25, 28; c/f Stroud’s Judiciary Dictionary of Words and Phrases (4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, London 1974) 2287 
for the opinion that “Recommendation” in a will implies a freedom to follow or not to follow;  to accept or to reject the 
recommendation according to one’s own discretion.”  
3
 (Nwabueze (n41) 303( underlining supplied for emphasis)  
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Judicial Council while forming the basis of the recommendation of the National Judicial Council cannot form 
the foundation of the appointment to be made by the Governor under s.271(1) of the 1999 Constitution. 
It is further submitted that the setting aside by the Federal High Court Port Harcourt of the recommendation of 
Hon. Justice Daisy Okocha, J., by the National Judicial Council to the Governor of Rivers State for appointment 
to the office of Chief Judge of Rivers State cannot be interpreted as paving the way for the Governor to appoint 
Hon. Justice P.N.C. Agumagu, P., to the office of Chief Judge of Rivers State without a fresh recommendation 
by the National Judicial Council.1 This is particularly so since the learned trial Judge had declined to make any 
consequential order after setting aside the recommendation of the NJC to the Governor of Rivers State.  
In any event, it is not for the court to recommend to the Governor of a State the person to be appointed to the 
office of Chief Judge of the State nor can the court direct the Governor of a State to appoint the preferred 
candidate of the State Judicial Service Commission. That duty is reserved exclusively to the National Judicial 
Council by the 1999 Constitution and cannot be usurped by the court.  
It is submitted that the option open to the Governor of Rivers State following the judgment of the Federal High 
Court Port Harcourt was to direct the Rivers State Judicial Service Commission to send a fresh list of nominees 
to the National Judicial Council advising the latter of suitable persons to be considered for recommendation to 
the Governor. It is very arguable that by proceeding to appoint Hon. Justice P. N. C. Agumagu, P., without the 
recommendation of the NJC, the Governor clearly denied the council the vital role assigned to it by the 
constitution in the appointment of Chief Judge of the State and this taints the appointment with 
unconstitutionality. The 1999 Constitution will never give the NJC the right of participation in the appointment 
of Chief Judge of a State with “one hand and remove such right with another hand.”2 
The rationale for vesting the National Judicial Council with the power of recommending to the Governors 
suitable persons for appointments to the offices of Chief Judges of the States of the federation is not farfetched.  
First, in the words of Mohammed, J.S.C., the arrangement is designed to ensure “checks and balances between 
the three arms of government” and thereby guarantee “transparency and observance of the rule of law.3  
Secondly, the active participation of the National Judicial Council in the appointment of Chief Judges and 
Judges of the High Courts of States of the federation is designed to guarantee the independence of the judiciary. 
To be sure, the independence of the judiciary which is the cornerstone of the rule of law demands that the 
judiciary should not be subservient or subordinated to the executive arm of government in terms of the 
appointment, discipline and removal of judicial officers. Judges are to dispense justice fairly and evenly to all 
parties appearing before them without fear of earning the displeasure of the executive or the temptation of 
seeking their favour. Lord Denning stated the concept of independence of the judiciary thus: 
If I be right thus far‒ that recourse must be had to law – it follows as a necessary 
corollary that the judges must be independent.  They must be free from any 
influence by those who wield power.  Otherwise they cannot be trusted to decide 
whether or not the power is being abused or misused. This independence, I am proud 
to say, has been achieved in England. The judges for nearly 300 years now have 
been absolutely independent not only of government and of Ministers, but also of 
trade unions, of the press, and of the media. They will not be diverted from their 
duty by any extraneous influences; not by hope of reward nor by the fear of 
penalties; not by flattering praise nor by indignant reproach. It is the sure knowledge 
of this that gives the people their confidence in the judges.4   
According to Hon. Justice Oputa, the concept of independence of the judiciary implies the followings: 
i. That the decision of important and controversial cases and issues shall proceed on the basis of 
merit and principle rather than on the basis of expediency. 
ii. It means resisting the pressure of hysteria and fanaticism. 
iii. It is that ingredient which allows a judge to rise above passion, above public clamour and above 
the politics of the moment.   
iv. It insulates the judge from Executive and legislative violence and mob hysteria and violence. 
                                                          
1
 Governor of Rivers State (n1). 
2
 Elelu-Habeeb’s case  (n31)  per Adekeye, J.S.C. @ 521. 
3
 Elelu-Habeeb’s case (n31) @ 493. 
4
 Rt. Hon. Lord Denning, What Next in the Law (Butterworth’s, London 1982) 310, Nwabueze defined the concept of an 
independent judiciary as “implying; “first that the” powers exercised by the courts in the adjudication of disputes is 
independent of legislative and executive powers, so as to make it usurpation to attempt to exercise it either directly by 
legislation, as by a Bill of Attainder, or by vesting any part of it in a body which is not a court; secondly, that the personnel of 
the court are independent of the legislature and the executive as regards their appointment, removal and other conditions of 
service.” See B.O. Nwabueze, Military Rule and Constitutionalism in Nigeria (Spectrum Law Publications, 1992) 23; See 
also Afe Babalola “Corruption, Democracy and Human, Rights in West Africa” in Ayo Olanrewaju and Basil Fawehinmi 
Biobaku (eds), Afe Babalola, The Living Legend Vol. II (Biographers Nigeria Limited, Ikeja 2008) 8 @ 25-26. 
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v. Without judicial independence no judge, however brilliant and hardworking, however well 
prepared by qualities of heart, mind and professional training, can give full effect to the enduring 
values enshrined in the constitution or even do justice to  justice.1  
It is submitted that the concept of independence of the judiciary has both subjective and objective elements.  The 
subjective element relates to the personality and quality of the judex; his character, integrity, learning, and 
independence of mind.  A judge who lacks learning, industry and integrity is less likely to be independent no 
matter the constitutional guarantee. This point was well made by Ade-Ajayi and Akinseye-George when they 
noted that: 
It seems from Kayode Eso’s performance in judicial office that the personal qualities 
of a judicial officer, that is, his learning, character and industry are the primary 
factors on which the independence of the judge largely depends.  In other words, 
although a judge may be appointed under a defective constitutional arrangement, his 
independence and performance in judicial office will ultimately depend more on his 
personalities.2  
The above view was also shared by Hon. Justice Oputa who posited that judicial independence will scarcely 
exist where the judge himself lacks the requisite measure of self-confidence.  As the eminent jurist stated it, “if a 
judge merits his appointment he is more likely to have his own view and will not allow himself to be pushed 
about.”3  
The objective element of judicial independence relates to the constitutional and institutional prerequisites for 
insulating judges from the external influence of those who wield power.  In this respect, the process of 
appointment, conditions of service, discipline, and removal of judges should be free from undue executive 
influence and manipulations.  The rationale for this requirement according to Hon. Justice Kayode Eso is that:  
A judge whose appointment has been so influenced by the Governor, might consider 
himself, or, at least, be so considered, by the public, to whom he should appear 
independent (and this is worse) to be answerable to his benefactor, the Governor.4    
Arguably, if the process of appointment of a person to the office of Chief Judge of a State is characterized by 
needless executive influence and manipulations, the likelihood is that the Chief Judge will not only dance to the 
tune of the executive but will also yield himself to unimaginable external influence.  
It is submitted that both the subjective and objective elements of judicial independence must coalesce in order to 
ensure a vibrant judiciary that can truly serve as the last hope of the common man. Sir Ivor Jennings stated it 
thus:  
This indicates that the independence of the judges depends rather upon a general 
feeling that judges ought to be independent, and in particular upon the independent 
spirit of the legal profession, than upon the forms of the law, though the forms were 
useful in establishing the tradition and must be maintained to assist the maintenance 
of the tradition. The demand for judicial independence rests upon a belief that the 
judicial function demands impartiality.5 
It is in order to preserve the independence of the judiciary in both the subjective and objective senses that the 
Framers of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) deliberately entrust the National Judicial Council with the 
exclusive power to recommend suitable persons to the State Governors for appointments as Chief Judges of the 
States of the federation. In order to guarantee the independence of the NJC in the discharge of this onerous duty, 
s. 158 (1) of the 1999 Constitution provides that in the exercise of its power to make recommendations for 
appointments or exercise disciplinary control over judicial officers, the NJC “shall not be subject to the direction 
or control of any other authority or person.” In Manuwa v. National Judicial Council,6 the Court of Appeal held 
that the purport of s. 158 (1) of the 1999 Constitution is that the NJC shall remain independent and shall not be 
influenced by any person or authority while exercising its power to make appointments or exercise disciplinary 
control. According to the court, the independence of the NJC in respect of appointments starts from the point of 
recommendation to either the President or Governor as the case may be and during this process, no authority or 
person can interfere by giving directives or exercising any form of control over the council.    
The vesting of this onerous power in the National Judicial Council can be justified on the ground that apart from 
                                                          
1
 See Hon. Chukwudifu Oputa, “The Independence of the Judiciary in a Democratic Society – Its Need, its Positive and 
Negative Aspects” in T.O. Elias and M.I. Jegede (eds) Nigerian Essays in Jurisprudence (MIJ Publishers Limited, Lagos 
1993) 222, 230.  
2
 See J.F. Ade-Ajayi and Yemi Akinseye-George, Kayode Eso: The Making of a Judge (Spectrum Books Limited Abuja 2002) 
136.  
3
 Oputa (n52) 231;  
4
 See Kayode Eso, “Further Thoughts on law and Jurisprudence (Spectrum Law Publishing, Abuja 2003) 264. 
5
 Sir Ivor Jennings, The Law and the Constitution (fifth edn, The English Language Book Society, Kent 1979) 244-5. 
6
 [2013] 2 N. W. L. R. (Pt. 1337) 1 @ 24-6 
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the peculiar advantage which the council has by virtue of the caliber of its membership to assess the performance 
and industry of judges, the council is also seised of all relevant materials and information on all judicial officers 
and is placed in the best position to make informed recommendations to the State Governors. The peculiar 
advantage which the NJC has cannot avail a State Governor because the latter simply does not have the capacity 
to assess the performance, integrity and comportment of individual judges. It is obviously for these reasons that 
the recommendations of the National Judicial Council have generally been treated with the greatest respect by 
the executive until the recent crisis that erupted in Rivers State.  
One is not by any means suggesting that the NJC should be a lord unto itself when performing its constitutional 
duty of recommending suitable candidates to State Governors for appointment as Chief Judges or while 
exercising disciplinary control over Judges. To be sure, the actions of the NJC are liable to judicial review by the 
courts in the exercise of their supervisory jurisdiction where the NJC exceeds its power or exercises it in a 
manner inconsistent with the relevant constitutional provisions. However, a court exercising its power of judicial 
review over a decision of the NJC which is sought to be impugned has no jurisdiction to substitute its own 
opinion for that of the NJC because it is not part of the purpose of judicial review to substitute the opinion of the 
judiciary or of individual judges for that of the authority constituted by law to decide the matters in question. 
What the court is concerned with is the manner by which the decision being impugned was reached and not its 
merits or wisdom. 1 
 
      THE WAY FORWARD  
In view of the unimaginable damage which the crisis in the Rivers State Judiciary had inflicted on the entire 
State, the need to forestall its reoccurrence has become imperative. While the crisis lasted, it was obvious that 
those who wielded power in the State had refused to place the corporate interest of the State above their personal 
interests and to uphold the constitution which they swore to protect.  
Several proposals were made by different interest groups including the Nigerian Bar Association on how to 
resolve the crisis in the Rivers State Judiciary. It was  even suggested by some commentators that the two 
contenders to the office of Chief Judge of Rivers State, namely Hon. Justice P. N. C. Agumagu, and Hon. Justice 
Daisy Okocha, Ag. C.J., should either be persuaded to retire voluntarily or forced to retire from the service of the 
Rivers State Judiciary in order to pave way for a new list of nominees to be sent by the Rivers State Judicial 
Service Commission to the National Judicial Service Council. 
The drawback of the above proposal was that compulsory retirement of a judicial officer presupposes that the 
judicial officer in question has been found guilty of a misconduct which was not the case here. Furthermore, a 
new list of nominees could not be transmitted by the Rivers State Judicial Service Commission to the NJC until a 
new Chief Judge or at least, an acting Chief Judge was appointed because by the clear provision of paragraph 
5(a) of Part II of the Third Schedule to the 1999 Constitution, the Chief Judge (and by logical extension, the 
Acting Chief Judge) is the chairman of the State Judicial Service Commission. The patent weakness of the above 
proposals clearly shows that the resolution of any similar crisis in future would not lie in any extra-constitutional 
option.  
In its attempt to provide interim solution to the crisis, the NJC appointed Hon. Justice Daisy Okocha, J., to 
function as the “Administrative Judge”2 of the High Court of Rivers State with the specific mandate to assign 
cases to Judges of the High Court of Rivers State and carry out other administrative functions necessary to keep 
the Rivers State Judiciary going. Thus, the essence of the appointment was to enable Judges to attend to the 
thousands of matters pending before them and allow new matters to be filed and assigned within the Port 
Harcourt Judicial Division of the High Court of Rivers State.3 However, this option also failed to provide the 
needed solution because of the threat issued by the Amaechi’s administration to sack any staff of the Rivers State 
Judiciary who recognized or took directives from Hon. Justice Daisy Okocha as the Administrative Judge of the 
High Court of Rivers State.  
For the long term solution, there is need to re-examine the entire s. 271(1) and (4) of the 1999 Constitution (as 
amended) in the light of the crisis that engulfed the Rivers State Judiciary over the appointment of the Chief 
Judge of the State. It is humbly suggested that s. 271(1) of the 1999 Constitution should be amended to bring it 
in line with s. 271(4) of the self-same Constitution by prescribing that only the most senior Judge of the High 
Court of a State shall be recommended by the National Judicial Council (NJC) to the Governor of the State for 
appointment to the office of Chief Judge of the State. It must be noted that s. 271(4) of the 1999 Constitution 
does not confer any discretion on the NJC as to whether or not to recommend the most senior Judge of the State 
                                                          
1
 Abdullahi v. Governor, Kano State [2014] 16 N. W. L. R. (Pt. 1433) 213 @ 246; Manuwa (n57) 25.  
2
 Every Judge or the most senior of the Judges sitting in a judicial division outside Port Harcourt is in a sense an 
“administrative judge” because he assigns cases filed in that division or causes them to be transferred to the Chief Judge for 
re-assignment in appropriate circumstances.  
3
 The Chief Judge or “Administrative Judge” is not required to assign cases to High Court Judges sitting outside the Port 
Harcourt Judicial Division except such cases are transferred matters.  
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for appointment as the Acting Chief Judge of the State. This is understandable because there is no reason to 
suppose that a serving Judge of the High Court of the State will be considered unfit or unsuitable by the NJC to 
occupy the office of the Acting Chief Judge of a State.  The disciplinary power conferred on the NJC over 
Judges of the State Judiciary under paragraph 21(d) of Part I of the First Schedule to the 1999 Constitution 
enables it to deal with cases of indiscipline among judges. Accordingly, it can be said that any reason that would 
disqualify the most senior Judge from being appointed as Acting Chief Judge of a State would have disqualified 
him from continuing to serve on the High Court Bench in the first instance. Thus, it is difficult to fathom any 
circumstance that would disqualify a serving most senior Judge of the High Court of a State from being 
appointed as the Acting Chief Judge of the State.  
It is submitted that the provision of section 271(4) of the 1999 Constitution relating to the appointment of the 
Acting Chief Judge of a State should be replicated for the appointment of the Chief Judge of a State and that the 
NJC should not possess any discretionary power as to whether or not to recommend the most senior Judge of the 
High Court of a State to the Governor for appointment as the Chief Judge of the State. It is very arguable that 
this proposal will enhance predictability and minimize politicization in the process of appointment of Chief 
Judge of a State.  One cannot agree more with the Chief Justice of Nigeria,  Hon. Justice Mahmud Mohammed, 
C. J. N. that: 
The violation of the principle of checks and balances by the state governor in Rivers 
State as enshrined in the constitution for the appointment and discipline of erring 
chief judges or judges is equally unacceptable. Seniority is part and parcel of the 
legal profession. To just appoint a chief judge from any position without recourse to 
seniority arrangement is an invitation to anarchy in the system, just as we are 
witnessing in Rivers State. 1   
It is also clear from the crisis in the Rivers State Judiciary the appointment of a State Chief Judge could create 
overt conflict between the recommending authority (NJC) and the appointing authority (State Governor). It was 
the irreconcilable positions taken by the NJC and the former Rivers State Governor that forced the later to 
appoint Hon. Justice P. N. C. Agumagu as the Chief Judge of Rivers State without the prior favourable 
recommendation of the former. In order to forestall such clash of authority in future, it is proposed that section 
271(1) of the 1999 Constitution should be redrafted to prohibit any unilateral appointment of the Chief Judge of 
a State by the Governor without the prior recommendation of the National Judicial Commission.  The proposed 
amended section 271(1) of the 1999 Constitution should read thus:  
s. 271(1) Whenever the office of Chief Judge of a State becomes vacant, the Governor of the 
State shall appoint the most senior Judge of the High Court of the State as the Chief 
Judge of the State on the recommendation of the National Judicial Commission 
subject to confirmation of the appointment by the House of Assembly of the State:  
Provided that under no circumstances shall the Governor of the State purport to 
appoint any person to the office of the Chief Judge of the State without the prior 
recommendation of the National Judicial Council. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS  
It is the view of this paper that the appointment of a person to the office of Chief Judge of a State is far too 
serious to be left to the absolute discretion and dictates of a State Governor. The NJC must be actively involved 
in the process of appointment and no appointment of a Chief Judge or Judge of the State High Court should be 
made by a governor without the prior recommendation of the NJC. The governor is not to dictate to the NJC who 
should be recommended to him for appointment as Chief Judge nor is he to determine the criteria to be used by 
the NJC in making its recommendation.  
There is no doubt that the crisis in the Rivers State Judiciary seriously constrained “the legitimacy of effective 
democratic governance”2 in the State whilst it lasted.  In an emerging federal democracy like ours where the 
constitutionality of various executive and legislative actions requires to be tested in the court of law, no one 
could ever have imagined that the gates of the High Court of Justice could be sealed for upwards of one year 
without any genuine efforts by those in authority to resolve the impasse.  
Needless to say that the crisis in the Rivers State encouraged resort to self-help and other forms of criminality 
which posed serious threats to the stability of our fledgling democracy. The Police cells throughout the State 
were filled with detainees who should have been arraigned before the courts. As the Police cells became 
completely over-stretched, the Police was constrained to decline to keep some suspects in their custody even in 
cases where such suspects would have been detained to safeguard the lives and properties of other Nigerians.  
Nigerians and foreigners doing business in the State who suffered infraction of their legal rights were unable to 
seek redress in the court of law. The government of Rivers State also lost huge revenue from filing fees payable 
                                                          
1
 Adesomoju (n6).  
2
 Wifa (n44) 25.   
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by litigants and applicants. Properties bequeathed by Wills were tied up because such Wills could not be read nor 
probate granted. Applicants for letters of administration were frustrated in their quest to obtain the needed legal 
authority from the court to manage the properties left behind by their deceased loved ones. Members of the legal 
profession were also thrown out of job as they could not represent their clients before the court. 
Thus, the adverse impacts of the crisis in the Rivers State Judiciary on the state were palpably unimaginable. 
One thing is certain: the crisis had not only eroded public confidence in the capacity of the judiciary to continue 
to serve as the last hope of the common man but also compromised the security and welfare of the people which 
undoubtedly, are the primary purpose of government under s. 14(2)(b) of the 1999 Constitution.  
The enormity of the adverse impacts of the crisis in Rivers State Judiciary on democratic governance in the State 
and the need to forestall its reoccurrence in any part of the federation underscore the imperativeness of an urgent 
constitutional amendment in the manner set out in this paper. It is hoped that the proposed amendment will 
remove the discretionary power which the former Governor of Rivers State purportedly exercised to the 
detriment of administration of justice in Rivers State.  
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